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NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CAPACITY AND THE PATH OF REFORM 
1.  BACKGROUND 
  1.1  The North Korean nuclear crisis dates back to the 1993, when IAEA inspections 
concluded that weapons grade plutonium had been extracted from spent fuel at North 
Korea's nuclear facility at Yongbyon. Failure of on-off negotiations between North 
Korea and the US resulted in a tense stand-off. Military conflict was averted in July 
1994 through the conclusion of a deal between the two sides. Formalized as the 
Geneva Framework Agreement (GFA) of October 1994, the deal provided for energy 
assistance to North Korea (oil and the eventual supply of two light water nuclear 
reactors) in exchange for the disablement and eventual dismantling of existing nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon and other locations. 
  1.2  By the end of 2002, the GFA had collapsed. The ostensible trigger was the 
alleged confirmation of a uranium-based nuclear programme by North Korean 
negotiators to their US counterparts in October 2002. This prompted US cessation of 
the supply of oil (500,000 tons annually) to North Korea. Food aid and support for the 
light water reactors were also suspended. In response to US sanctions and UN 
condemnation, North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors and restarted its Yongbyon 
reactor (including the reprocessing of 800 spent fuel rods) and declared its right to 
possess nuclear weapons. 
  1.3  Even without the alleged October 2002 disclosures, the GFA was problematic 
given the loopholes of the agreement (especially over disclosure and verification), 
slow implementation of the light water project, and North Korean attempts to extract 
further concessions (eg by ballistic missile testing in 1998). The most decisive factor 
of all, however, was the ideological hostility towards North Korea by the new George 
W. Bush administration. In the post-September 11 climate, compromise with a 
nuclear-proliferating, anti-democratic state like North Korea (that had been linked to 
terrorism) was unacceptable to the neo-conservative Bush administration.  
  1.4  To resolve the crisis, both North Korea and the US agreed to participate in the 
Chinese-sponsored six-party talks (North Korea, US, China, South Korea, Russia, 
Japan) which begun in Beijing in August 2003. After four rounds lasting two years, an 
agreement of principle was signed in September 2005. The agreed declaration 
contained the following provisions: 
—  North Korean will denuclearize on a verifiable basis. 
—  US will refrain from attacking North Korea. 
—  US will refrain from reintroduction of nuclear weapons to South Korea. 
—  North Korea had the right to use civil nuclear energy. 
—  North Korea and US and Japan should seek to normalize diplomatic 
relations. 
—  North Korea will receive energy assistance from the five powers. 
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Implementation was to be based on the principle of "commitment for commitment, 
action for action". 
  1.5  The September Agreement soon ran into difficulties, especially over the 
modalities of implementation. For example, North Korea insisted on the delivery of a 
light water reactor (a process that would take years) before any denuclearization. In 
the same month, the US treasury imposed sanctions on Banco Delta Asia, a Macau-
based banks allegedly involved with North Korean counterfeiting, resulting in the 
freezing of $25 million of North Korean funds. The six-party process was halted and 
the situation deteriorated in 2006 as North Korea conducted a series of missile tests on 
4 July and tested a nuclear weapon on 9 October. While the US was unable to secure 
support for comprehensive sanctions against North Korea, the tests did not go 
unpunished. South Korea suspended fertilizer and food aid for one year in response to 
the July missile tests, while China reduced its aid (by two-thirds) and supported the 
UN (Resolution 1718) condemnation of the nuclear test and sent a high level envoy to 
North Korea. 
2.  THE FEBRUARY 2007 AGREEMENT 
  Against the background of international isolation, and economic pressure from its 
principal aid providers, North Korea returned to the six-party talks in December 2006. 
Under Congressional pressure to re-engage and in the absence of progress in the 
Middle East, the Bush administration decided to re-focus its efforts on settling the 
North Korea issue. Progress was surprisingly quick, and agreement was reached at the 
six-party talks in February 2007. The February Agreement is divided into two phases. 
  2.1  Phase 1 provisions: 
—  North Korea will freeze its nuclear installations at Yongbyon and invite 
back the IAEA inspectors. 
—  North Korea will discuss with the six parties its nuclear programmes, 
including plutonium extracted from the operation of its Yongbyon reactor. 
—  North Korea and the US will begin bilateral talks aimed at establishing full 
diplomatic relations. The US will begin the process of removing North Korea 
from its list of terror-sponsoring states, and advance the dismantling of 
economic sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act. 
—  North Korea and Japan will start bilateral talks aimed at resolving 
"outstanding issues". 
—  The US will resolve the issue of sanctions against Banco Delta Asia 
(within 30 days of the agreement). 
—  North Korea will receive 50,000 tons of heavy oil. 
  2.2  Phase 2 provisions: 
—  North Korea will declare all its nuclear programmes and disable all nuclear 
facilities. 
—  North Korea will receive one million tons of heavy fuel oil (including the 
initial shipment of 50,000 tons). 
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  2.3  North Korea received its frozen funds in Banco Delta Asia in June 2007. In July, 
IAEA inspectors returned to Yongbyon and confirmed that the nuclear installations 
were shut down. South Korea delivered 50,000 tons of heavy oil to North Korea. 
High-level US-North Korean in September opened the way for the arrival of US 
technicians to Yongbyon. A 31 December 2007 deadline for declaration of North 
Korean programmes was ostensibly agreed. After initial progress, the 31 December 
deadline was not adhered to. The US demanded that North Korea complete 
disablement of Yongbyon and provide a full account of past and existing nuclear 
activities. North Korea responded by insisting that it had declared all its programmes 
and called on the US to comply with its obligations on energy aid, economic sanctions 
and the terrorism blacklist.  
3.  COMPLICATING FACTORS 
  The current impasse (as of April 2008) is not surprising from the past history of 
denuclearization agreements with North Korea. Apart from the intrinsic problems of 
the February Agreement arising from the mechanics of denuclearization, and the 
sequencing of concessions (who gives up what, how much, and when?), the recent 
leadership change in South Korea and the impending one in the US present additional 
complicating factors. 
  3.1  Predictably, "denuclearization" is difficult to implement given the absence of 
trust and divergence of understanding between the US and North Korea. 
Implementation of the principle of denuclearization is likely to be subject to 
disagreements over full disclosure of the extent of North Korea's nuclear capacity, the 
meaning of "denuclearization" verification, and the reciprocal concessions that North 
Korea expects. 
3.1.1  To denuclearize, North Korea first needs to give a full account of its 
capacities and that account needs to be acceptable to the other parties. Full 
disclosure of North Korea's nuclear programme includes not only the amount 
of weapons grade plutonium extracted from the 8,000 spent fuel rods after the 
reopening of the Yongbyon plant in 2003, but also the total amount of 
plutonium accumulated (since the opening of the Yongbyon plant in 1985), the 
number of nuclear weapons it possesses, and the any programmes outside of 
Yongbyon. All of these issues are problematic as the US estimates are likely to 
diverge from those given by North Korea. For example, the US claims that 
there is a nuclear programme based on highly enriched uranium, a claim 
denied by North Korea. 
3.1.2  What does "denuclearization" mean? The US insists on the 
"disablement" of nuclear facilities to the extent that operation cannot easily be 
restarted. Does "denuclearization" apply to the capacity to make nuclear 
weapons or to North Korean possession of any nuclear capability, including 
civil? Here the North Koreans have indicated that they expect to have to be 
supplied with light water reactors (LWRs) as compensation for the closure of 
their existing reactors (the 1994 GFA also committed to providing North 
Korea with LWRs). 
3.1.3  The verification regime under the February Agreement is limited. The 
role of the IAEA is confined to monitoring the freezing of the Yongbyon 
facility. The September 2007 discussions allowed for the arrival of US 
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technicians at Yongbyon. Thus the system of inspection and verification for 
any installations beyond Yongbyon will need to be negotiated with the North 
Koreans (who deny the existence of such facilities). Even if agreement can be 
reached on the existence of nuclear facilities, the mode of verification is likely 
to be contentious given North Korea's history of opposition to intrusive 
inspection. 
3.1.4  What reciprocal concessions do the North Koreans expect? The 
February Agreement commits the other signatories to the provision of heavy 
oil (one million tons), US removal of North Korea from the terror blacklist and 
the ending of US economic sanctions. Statements from North Korea, however, 
point to expectations for more extensive concessions as the price for full 
denuclearization. These include oil shipments beyond the specified amount, 
the (longstanding) demand for the construction of LWRs, and the concomitant 
reduction of US military forces on the Korean peninsula. Even if these 
demands could be agreed in principle, their implementation will extend the 
denuclearization schedule for an indefinite period into the future. There is also 
strong US (and South Korean) expectation that aid and diplomatic 
normalization will also be accompanied by conventional force reduction on 
the North Korean side. 
  3.2  The US electoral cycle introduces an element of uncertainty. The prospect of 
improved relations at the end of the Clinton administration was halted by the new 
Bush administration in 2001. Therefore North Korea is watching and waiting for the 
outcome of the 2008 presidential contest (just as it did in 2004, when the six-party 
process stalled). North Korea is unlikely to commit fully to denuclearization unless it 
can be sure that the guarantees made by one administration will be maintained by its 
successor. North Korea is likely to be most apprehensive about a McCain victory. 
Senator McCain was a critic of the 1994 GFA and had advocated a more robust 
approach to "rogue states" (including North Korea) during the 1990s. It is worth 
quoting his recent comments on the subject of North Korea, which hint at a widening 
of the list of concessions expected by the US: 
North Korea's totalitarian regime and impoverished society buck these trends 
[towards democracy]. It is unclear today whether North Korea is truly 
committed to verifiable denuclearization and a full accounting of all its 
nuclear materials and facilities, two steps that are necessary before any lasting 
diplomatic agreement can be reached. Future talks must take into account 
North Korea's ballistic missile programs, its abduction of Japanese citizens, 
and its support for terrorism and proliferation. (Source: Foreign Affairs, 
Volume 86 (6) November/December 2007, section 3 paragraph 3, html version) 
  3.3  The administration of newly inaugurated South Korean President Lee Myung-
Bak has stated that it intends to take a less indulgent attitude towards North Korea 
than its predecessors. While the previous Roh administration reduced food aid in 2006 
in response to North Korean testing of missiles and a nuclear device, it did not support 
US calls for comprehensive sanctions or the forceful interdiction of North Korean 
shipping under the Proliferation Security Initiative. Indeed, it maintained and 
expanded key projects (notably the Mount Kumgang Tourism Project and the 
Kaesong Special Economic Zone) that provide North Korea with much needed 
foreign exchange. Roh's approach reflects the belief that a generous approach towards 
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North Korea ultimately yields more benefit (in softening the North's attitude, 
promoting the development of civil society) than either confrontation or strict 
insistence on quid pro quos. By contrast, President Lee has indicated that he will take 
a more conditional approach towards North Korea meaning that economic aid will 
depend upon tangible results in the areas of denuclearization, demilitarization and 
human rights. Of course, President Lee's scope for manoeuvre will also depend on the 
result of the forthcoming April 2008 national assembly elections. 
4.  DENUCLEARIZATION AND NORTH KOREA'S REFORM PATH 
  Whether these complicating factors can be overcome depends on the North Korean 
leadership's vision of systemic change. A secure external environment (centred on 
improving relations with the US and the opportunities for aid and investment that 
flow from normalization) is a necessary but insufficient condition for the introduction 
of substantive market reform in North Korea. Equally important will be the 
acceptance of the principle of reform amongst North Korean leaders. Readiness for 
substantive reform will reinforce denuclearization and demilitarization. By contrast, a 
leadership preference for "muddling through" will have the opposite effect. 
  4.1  North Korea's leaders seek to remain in power indefinitely and will maintain a 
level of social control consistent with that objective. Any future post-Kim Jong-Il 
non-dynastic leadership will also aspire to power retention using social control. Given 
the status accorded to the military as part of Kim Jong-Il's post-1994 power 
consolidation and as a response to the 1990s economic crisis, it is likely that military 
leaders will play a leading role in any post-Kim leadership. Successful reform will 
depend on high status military leaders recognizing the priority of achieving a 
successful civilian economy. 
  4.2  The small size of North Korea and its weak position vis-a"-vis South Korea 
means that the North Korean leadership feels more vulnerable than its counterparts in 
China or Vietnam. Accordingly, its approach to economic reform is likely to be more 
cautious. 
  4.3  Historically Kim Il-Sung and Kim Jong-Il have been lukewarm about Chinese-
style market reforms. Apart from ideological hostility, concerns about loss of 
economic control and social challenges to the regime always outweighed concerns 
about productivity. However, North Korean leaders seem to have reappraised the 
Chinese experience. There are grounds for expecting North Korea to increasingly 
copy aspects of Chinese reform. 
4.3.1  China's initial agricultural reforms of 1978 (de-collectivization) simply 
sanctioned what was already taking place at the local level in response to food 
shortages. Similarly, North Korea's economic collapse of the 1990s led to the 
spontaneous rise of non-state economic activities (especially private farming, 
light manufacturing and primitive markets) as the state could no longer 
provide employment and goods for the desperate population. Other reforms 
include the 2002 wage-price reform (to reflect scarcities more accurately), 
accelerated development of special economic zones (notably Kaesong) and 
greater managerial autonomy. 
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4.3.2  The impressive results of China's modernization demonstrate to North 
Korean leaders a route for long term regime survival by promoting economic 
growth without surrendering the monopoly of power. This shift in attitude is 
reflected in Kim Jong-Il's praise for the Chinese model (especially the special 
economic zones), the dispatch of economics students to China, and in the 
enticement of Chinese entrepreneurs by the North Korean authorities. 
4.3.3  Over the last decade, China's influence over the North Korean economy 
has greatly enhanced through its leading role as aid provider, trade partner 
(from 28-43% between 2001 and 2005) and foreign investor. 
  4.4  On the other hand, the North Korean government has also attempted to assert its 
control over the fledgling private economy (over foreign exchange, over cross-border 
trade) as the economic crisis has eased. It continues to stress the relevance of state 
owned industries and central economic management. This suggests that while China's 
experience is influential, North Korea is also likely to learn from Vietnam and South 
Korea, countries with greater affinity to North Korea in terms of size and centralist 
background. 
4.4.1  The North Korean leaders may seek to maintain a substantial but 
revamped state industrial sector while inducing foreign participation in foreign 
exchange generating activities (working with state agencies via special 
economic zones, tourism projects, and mineral sector). This way, the state can 
retain control of the lead industrial sectors, minimize the spread of 
independent local entrepreneurs, keep cultural contacts with foreigners strictly 
regulated, and ease its foreign exchange constraints. Apart from employment 
rationalization (which will need to be severe), foreign expertise and 
investment (eg from South Korean conglomerates) will also be needed for the 
revamping of worthwhile state industries. Such a reform strategy represents 
the "development dictatorship" model, that it, North Korea's approximation of 
South Korea's centralized, state-directed capitalism of the 1960s-80s. Such a 
strategy is more consistent with North Korea's history of economic 
centralization (whereas Chinese provinces enjoyed a high degree of economic 
autonomy). Kim Jong-Il has also expressed admiration of the South Korean 
model. 
4.4.2  North Korean leaders may be politically too sensitive, and unwilling to 
risk any kind of substantive economic reform. Instead they may seek to 
"muddle through" by making the minimal adjustments necessary to maintain 
the current levels of foreign exchange receipts and aid flows. Keeping the 
nuclear threat alive as a bargaining counter, would be consistent with 
muddling through. Such behaviour would deepen North Korea's isolation and 
reinforce its dependence on nuclear diplomacy. This is the scenario least 
conducive to denuclearization and least attractive to the region as a whole. 
Given their desperate need for economic regeneration (eg GDP growth in 
2006 turned negative for the first time since 1999, a grain shortfall of one 
million tons by the end of 2007) to sustain power, even the most conservative 
North Korean leaders are likely to be aware of the limits of muddling through. 
Scenarios of a permanent gangster regime eking out a basic existence through 
aid extorted by nuclear diplomacy and the receipts of criminal activities (drug 
production and counterfeiting of goods and currency) are unrealistic. 
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  4.5  Thus the choice between substantive reform/denuclearization versus muddling 
through/brinkmanship depends in large part on the readiness of North Korea's leaders 
to accept substantive reform. That readiness arises from their calculations about 
internal political risks and external security. Their perceptions about the intentions of 
the US will be crucial to shaping the latter calculation. By the signals it conveys, the 
US will be able to shape those perceptions in the direction of substantive 
reform/denuclearization. 
4.5.1  The US should accept the North Korean political system as it stands and 
instead prioritize denuclearization and economic reform. It should look to the 
social transformation of North Korea over a long time frame driven by 
improved living standards, spread of the profit motive and generational change 
(ie North Korea as a slow motion replay of China or Vietnam). This means 
stepping away from the moral absolutism that has dominated much of the 
Bush administration (with few positive results). 
4.5.2  The North Koreans will not denuclearize until they can be sure that 
deals will not become hostages to fluctuations in domestic US politics as in 
2000. This raises the wider issue of how guarantees of aid and security can be 
carried across US administrations. Given the six party support of the current 
agreement, it has a more binding effect than the 1994 GFA. Progress on 
negotiation of a separate peace regime between the US, North Korea, China 
and South Korea (as called for under the February Agreement) will offer 
further reassurance to North Korea. These layers of multilateral reassurance 
will also make North Korean non-compliance with denuclearization difficult. 
4.5.3  The new US administration should rapidly indicate that it is committed 
to the implementation of the February Agreement. While the Middle East and 
Afghanistan will remain higher priorities for US, a US policy of deliberate 
neglect towards North Korea will only induce the North Koreans to force the 
issue back onto the international agenda (eg through further nuclear and 
missile testing, transfer of nuclear and missile technology). 
4.5.4  The US fears that North Korea's real agenda is to gain diplomatic 
normalization and other benefits without full denuclearization. What tends to 
be overlooked is the high value that North Korea places on developing 
friendly relations with the US. Beyond immediate economic benefits, North 
Korea seeks a relationship with the US in order to counter-balance China's 
growing influence on the Korean peninsula. As with Vietnam, there is 
potential for shared strategic interest between North Korea and the US. The 
dramatic improvements in US-China relations during the 1970s show how 
historical hostilities and divergence of political values can be put aside when 
there is sufficient political will motivated by shared interests. 
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